The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq

This is a book all Americans need to read. Our popular media has so oversimplified and sensationalized the Iraq war that most Americans do not understand what "victory" could look like. If you read this book you will be able to understand the real daily basis of the conflict(s). You will also be able to visualize a productive outcome after all of our national sacrifice.

Bing West describes in powerful detail the heart, soul and intellect of the U.S. soldier. You will be proud to know that many of those front line warriors knew the right way to win this war long before Washington figured it out. The positioning of the U.S. as the Iraqi people's "best friend or worst enemy" depending on their cooperation with us is an approach we, as Americans, can be proud of. This book made me proud.

If you want the truth about what happened in Iraq this is a start. Mr. West doesn't pull any punches and tells it like it was and is. He gives credit where it is due and spares no animus for those that deserve it. what I took away from this book was that we as a nation need to let our military take care of these situations. They know what is happening on the ground and they also know the way to solve the problems. Our politicians need to listen to those officers and enlisted men that want to succeed and not the ticket punchers that seem to talk the loudest and have all the right ears. We can win the wars and the peace if we stand united. Divided we will surely fall.

"The Strongest Tribe" summarizes Bing West's observations and interviews in and about Iraq since the Iraq War began in 2003. Sources are drawn from top generals down to front-line privates, as well as civilian leaders in Iraq. My only suggestion for Bing's book is that it include a brief summary of abbreviations etc. as there are so many it became difficult to recall exactly what they all meant.

Bing's first chapter, aptly titled "How to Create a Mess - Summer 2003" covers Bremer's dismissing the Iraqi Army, blocking the CIAs efforts to work with (pay) Sunni sheiks, de-Baathification (program reached into middle-management levels because Saddam's Iraq had too many "upper-managers"), delaying local elections that military leaders were trying to conduct, failing to fund projects - especially those hiring locals, and even trying to direct military operations.

An attempt was made to put 85,000 trained police on the streets within a year (3/1,000 citizens, vs. 5 in N.Y.C.), trained by 1,500 retired police from the U.S. and Europe - however, only 24 showed up.

Simultaneously, the White House and Rumsfeld envisioned troop withdrawals preceded by Americans pulling back to reduce vulnerability. The result was Iraq's streets and markets were left in the control of insurgent gangs.

2004 brought White House vascillation on invading Fallujah, Abu Ghraib, and empowering Iraqi leaders. A negative result of the latter was that for the next three years those leaders prohibited U.S. incursions into Sadr City (a strong insurgent holdout) and largely ignored U.S. input on Iraqi Army appointments and promotions. Part of the problem was Bremer's having put Allawi in as a lame duck P.M. with visions of becoming elected, and without input in choosing his 26 ministers. Another problem was that Iraqi monies were disbanded without systems to detect, let alone deter, massive fraud; worse yet, large portions of the Iraqi budget never were spent, hobbling army and police support.

2005 saw Iran spending $11 million/week to elect its Shiite candidates, while the U.S. provided no support for Allawi - further crippling his power. Voting was along sectarian lines and simply represented a census - except in Sunni areas. More importantly, Sunnis continually found themselves constantly discriminated against by the Shiite dominated government, while Shiites arrested by U.S. forces were repeatedly released almost immediately by Iraqi authorities. Worst of all, Iraqi police forces were often part of sectarian killing squads and widespread thefts, and rarely did anything useful.

By June, 2006, Bush realized the situation was not acceptable and began looking for a new strategy. Getting one ("The Surge") and new leaders took nine months.

Turning around Iraq involved cleaning out sectors, then securing them with concrete walls and check points. Another strategy was inserting U.S. soldiers along sectarian boundaries, further stymieing Shiite death squads. Still another was deciding to retain custody of Iraqis arrested by U.S. forces - preventing their immediate release by civilian leaders. Fortuitously, at this same point in time Sunni leaders had tired of Al Qaeda atrocities and were receptive (sometimes volunteering) to go after Al Qaeda - an action U.S. generals heartily supported despite Maliki's objections.

Bing continues, telling us that the Special Operations Command, not the 20 brigades commanded by Odierno, was responsible for most the senior Al Qaeda and Shiite militia leaders killed. However, he did not elaborate on how this took place - a key point!

Now, the big question is "What happens if the American military is withdrawn?"

One final note: Bing's book also reminds readers of the incredible valor and sacrifice of our American military in Iraq - not only the constant threat of death and serious injury, especially from IEDs, but functioning within Iraq's blast furnace heat - weighted down with 80 lbs. of gear and lacking any semblence of the comforts of home.

As an earlier reviewer noted, West looks at the Iraq war through the prism of Vietnam. Nothing necessarily wrong with that. As a Vietnam vet myself, I can't help but look at Iraq through the same prism. However, as a student of military history, fortunately I have other prisms to look through as well.

I give the book five stars. West has given a good review of the history of the Iraq war. The recitation is by now almost standard. We sent in too few troops. We failed to protect the average Iraqi from criminals, from diehards, and from foreign terrorists. We didn't kill Sadr when we had the chance. We punted on Fallujah when we should have cleared and held it. Finally we got it right when we sent in more troops and General Petraeus. For those who want to go deeper than this thumbnail sketch, the book is excellent. It names names, identifies mistakes, and tells who got it right. There's a wealth of valuable information in this book.

Where the book comes up a bit short is to focus too much on applying the lessons of Vietnam to Iraq. Yes, we should learn the lessons from past wars. But we've fought a lot more wars than Vietnam. For instance, why did it take so long to find General Petraeus? For much the same reasons as it took Abraham Lincoln so long to find General Grant. We need to know how to do better next time. The government that we're trying to support is weak and corrupt? If it weren't, of course, we wouldn't be in there. But we've faced this problem before: not only in Vietnam but Nicaragua in the 1920s, the Philippines after we took them from Spain, and South Korea. Can't we learn from those experiences, instead of starting from scratch each time?

I don't want to sound like I'm criticizing West for not writing the book I'd have written. I couldn't have written this book, and I really thank West for having written it. However, good as it is, we need to look to our entire national experience with war, to make sure we've really learned the lessons those wars teach, instead of forgetting them each generation.

I have been reading The Strongest Tribe so carefully, and while I am learning, really learning, about the war in Iraq, I am also very much enjoying the experience. Bing West has beautifully analyzed both his personal experience and the thousands of other facts he researched to produce a compelling story of the troops, their commanders, and Washington, as all of these players contributed to what now appears to be a successful endeavor. This book should be required reading! I have purchased and sent additional copies to my friends and family.

Lillian Decker